Nevada Test Site Oral History Project
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Interview with Charles McWilliam

July 9, 2004
Las Vegas, Nevada

Interview Conducted By
Joan Leavitt

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[00:00:00] Begin Track 2, Disk 1.

Joan Leavitt*: You've got some pictures that you'd like to describe and show, so why don't you just go ahead and start with that.*

Charles McWilliam: Actually, before we do that, we were talking earlier about how I got involved in JVE [Joint Verification Experiment]. And JVE was an ongoing process that actually started in January of '88 with a Soviet visit to the test site after, I call it, Ronnie and Gorby got together and decided we ought to do something about verifying the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. At the time of the January visit, I was chief of one of the branches at the test site that supported everything that supported the Soviets coming in; food, lodging, transportation, security, all that kind of stuff. I provided the support for that. As part of that visit, they went back to Geneva and came up with agreements to start working on doing a joint verification experiment, both in the U.S. and the Soviet Union [USSR]. The first group of Soviets, and I'm going off memory, probably showed up in March or April to start doing geological work. That was a group of seven. At that point, as I mentioned, Stewart was supposed to be the lead for it because that's what his division—

John Stewart.

John Stewart. Yes. John Stewart, and that's what his division did. He didn't want to come out to the test site every day, so I volunteered to Jim Magruder that I would take that since I'm out here anyway. And so I became the lead U.S. representative to meet with the Soviets, to negotiate all

the support, all the requirements we'd have to meet that *they* could meet, and we were working off, at that point, a draft agreement from Geneva. Well, we actually got so far ahead of the work in Geneva that we were doing the negotiating, deciding what would happen when, and then they were implementing it, putting it on paper and in writing in Geneva. So it was a work in progress, and the work was going in front of the paperwork.

So there was a group of seven Soviets that showed up.

Do you remember their names?

I probably have a list somewhere. Maybe when we go through the pictures, I can identify them. Some of them I'll be able to identify pretty easy.

We had no organization in place to begin this process, so we were basically—

It was very sudden. You got the word in November and things had to be moving in January.

Yeah, and it happened real fast. And so we started pulling in the expertise from our organization that we thought would be worthwhile. On those daily meetings we had the USGS [United States Geological Survey] folks, the Fenix & Scisson, our contractor that did drilling, both of the labs [Los Alamos and Livermore], EG&G [Edgerton, Germeshausen, and Grier], REECo [Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company], all the various contractors that provided support. So we'd have at least a member from each one of those organizations that would be interacting with the Soviets on a daily basis.

These were primarily the contractors and government organizations that had been used to using the test site?

Correct. We may need to back up. The laboratories, basically Livermore and Los Alamos, provided criteria: `This is what we need to do to conduct a test. This is what we need.` The DOE [Department of Energy] office here and our contractors provided that.

How old were you at this time?

Let's see, this was '88, so I was thirty-seven.

You were one of the younger members of this group.

Yes, I was one of the younger members.

Were you dealing mainly with technical people in your group?

On both sides. And we'll go through some of the personalities. As we go through the pictures, I can describe them to you. And that's what made it *really easy* because everybody was—

Is because technical language—

It's the same.

Yeah. It's an international language.

Except for the interpreters. The translators/interpreters had a heck of a time because although at that point we thought the world evolved around nuclear testing, it's really a very *small* number of people in the world, in *both* countries, that were nuclear testers and understood what it took.

How many people, do you think, in the United States can understand? How small is that group?

[00:05:00] At that point, I would have said three thousand people in the U.S.

And how many do think that there was in the Soviet Union?

Probably a similar number.

About three thousand.

Now, that's somebody that understands a piece of it. If you start looking at somebody that understood the *whole* picture, we're probably talking less than a hundred in each.

In each country.

In each country, and I was one of those unique people that understood *all* the sciences involved, having been involved in nuclear testing at that point for about fifteen years. I understood the big picture and everything that went into making it, so that just fell right into my lap.

You had said that sometimes it was a challenge to retrain Department of Defense [DoD] people who were more temporary and would come in and out.

Yes.

And that the technical world had a challenge in educating people who make public policies and who are part of other agency groups.

Well, that's very true. Through all this process, and really the latter parts of JVE when we were starting to *implement* the treaty. I've got some pictures of that—what was called an AI device, anti-intrusive device negotiation *after* JVE, but this was part of the JVE that *never* got ironed out. So we went into Moscow during one trip, and at this point organizational changes in Washington had occurred. Our lead was at that point from ACDA, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and then we have had people from On-Site Inspection Agency [OSIA], people from office of secretary of defense, and these are policy people from Washington that don't understand technical terms or what we required.

What's possible and what isn't possible.

We actually had those people accusing the DOE laboratory people of passing secrets to the Soviets because we could talk back and forth with the Soviets, understand what they were saying, they understood what we were saying. The other policy folks—policy weenies, I'll call them, and you'll hear this term from time to time—didn't have a clue. They wouldn't know what was secret and what wasn't. So, because they didn't understand what was going on, *we* must have been doing something wrong. And this is part of what you see in interagency working

groups in Washington. There's so many jealousies and empire building. They don't work together to get something done. But yes, it's a *big* problem getting the policy makers in Washington to understand the realities of the world- that science tells you this can be done, this can't be done.

Now, one of those realities seems to have to do with verification, because on the PNET [Peaceful Nuclear Explosives Treaty] *treaty and on the Limited Test Ban, both of them had language that said the Soviets would have access to the testing explosive sites, and the Americans would have access to the testing explosive sites. Now, my question, and this was back in 1974 and '76, that someone, I'm assuming a policy maker, said that this would be possible, and the technical people said, it's not possible. Is that kind of the debate that went on?*

That's kind of the debate that went on.

OK, so that's one of the reasons why it took twelve years for a verification to finally come together and say, This is possible.

Right. To finally hammer out what—

You explained why it wasn't possible?

It wasn't possible when you look at it from the picture, and part of it has to do with logistics, and these are some of the things that got hammered out through the JVE. If we have access to the site, what's that mean? We can stand around and watch? That doesn't do any good. So until somebody goes through and defines, What does "access" mean? What are we going to gain from it? Is it worth, one, risking people's lives because you're putting them in places that are not very nice, and what logistics do we need? Are they going to provide housing? Food? Water? Clean air? That's all the kinds of stuff that weren't described. And does "access" mean we get to see the nuclear device?

That falls under the category of intrusiveness, doesn't it?

Right. Yeah.

And protecting the national secrets. And the suspicion seemed to be one of the biggest obstacles of all.

[00:10:00] Yes, and I can tell you things like, and this is after the first group of seven. This is later, when Viktor Mikhailov showed up who, at that point, had been a Professor M. Nobody really knew his name or who he was, but he was like a lab director, their version of Los Alamos, Arzamas 16. And they were *scared to death* of Americans. We were baby killers; we were mean, bad people. We were concerned the first week for his health. His blood pressure went through the roof. He had almost passed out one time. It was this bad that he was so worried about not only meeting with Americans but being able to make a good showing.

You said that they absolutely did not like being embarrassed. That was one of the worst things you could do to a Soviet was to embarrass them. That's almost life or death to them.

Correct. That's right. That's right. So if you wanted somebody to succeed on their side, you wanted to make sure they didn't get embarrassed.

That was a quick culture thing that you had to learn, wasn't it?

Oh, yeah, there was a *lot* of things that we learned real fast, and there was a lot of things that I didn't realize *why* things were a certain way until I'd gone to the Soviet Union.

Well, they didn't have a problem embarrassing you.

Oh, no.

Because it seemed like whenever you *made a mistake, they would rake you over the coals for it.*

Oh, yes, yes, every time, *every* time. But in our culture, it's not that big a deal, but they thought they were really doing something. And only once, consciously, did I have to embarrass one of their folks because—

Shmatov. Alex Shmatov.

Yes. Because *I* needed somebody in charge, and at that point I had two people, the technical head and their political head, and I needed to sort *their* folks out, so I had one person. And by embarrassing him, he was no longer in the lead.

Was a decision that—did you make that by yourself, or did you do that, consulting with—?

Yes. I talked it over with Magruder, saying, `I'm having this problem and I'm going to solve it`. And that was how I solved it, and it just happened to work itself into that situation where I could.

That was brilliant.

Well, it worked. It was one of those risks you take and you say, It's got to happen.

Where do you think they got *their impressions of Americans as baby killers and things like that?*

This group, and Shmatov wasn't one of those, but the techies had been so isolated, even from their *own* society, that all the brainwashing they did was where they got it. And I'll tell you another story out of school, but this was on my second time into the Soviet Union, where we had to move the drill rig and equipment over to Nakhodka—Vladivostok—to ship it out.

This was after the JVE.

After the JVE.

And they weren't going to fly the C-5—they weren't going to do the expensive route back and you had to go the long way home on a boat, right?

Right. Well, I didn't actually ride the boat. We ended up flying it from Kazakhstan to Vladivostok, and that's a whole long other story. But on this trip—and this was two-and-a-half weeks, and we never knew where we were going to be and where we were going to sleep during this whole time, so everybody got pretty buddy-buddy. We were all together—so we had two KGB escorts, a good guy and a bad guy. They played the good cop/bad cop thing. But we were sitting in Nakhodka, waiting to on load the equipment onto the ship. We were waiting for the ship—. He comes to me one evening and says, Have you got anything for me to read in English? Because he's our interpreter, too, from the Soviet side. And I *had* brought in a U.S. history of World War II because of stories I had heard from other Soviets, saying to the effect that we helped the Nazis against the Soviet Union. So I had figured out these guys have a misimpression. They've been taught all along that we were the bad guys, even back in World War II, their great patriotic war.

That we were on the side of the Nazis.

Yes. And so I brought this book in with me on this trip. And we weren't supposed to give gifts that would change their understandings of things, but since he asked for it, Here. Go ahead and read this. He sat up all night, read that whole book, and the next day he had a totally different expression on his face. It was just like the light had gone on and all of a sudden, the Americans weren't so bad.

[00:15:00] *And this was* after *Gorbachev's time of freedom of speech and things like that, and they still had these various misconceptions.*

Yes. It was not coming in and changing very rapidly. And this was a guy stationed at Moscow. These two Soviet KGB escorts, when we first met with them, I was talking to one and saying, Oh, here, you're going to get to see your country, get to go across.

[And he said] I don't want to go on this. I was told to do this.

Because Moscow is their heaven. That's the only place they ever want to go. The rest of the country, they think, is junk.

So it's not that they even see *their own country.*

They don't want to.

Not especially—they're not tourists; they're not interested.

No.

And you also said that they seldom smiled.

Yes. Early on, we'd get rumors of the U.S. people over there getting very depressed. Well, when I started going *over,* I started looking at why are these people getting depressed. And it's because you *never* see a smile. And my first time in, I think I was there for six weeks, and I got on a Lufthansa Airline in Moscow, and the stewardess smiled, and it was like I'd died and gone to heaven. It clicked right then what's been missing. So that next trip back in, where we were going coast to coast over the Soviet Union, I turned to our interpreter while we were sitting in a bus waiting for—well, actually, they were getting me some medication out of a pharmacy because I had pneumonia at this point, and I was the *only* one on the list to go back in, so I had to go *back* in with pneumonia.

You were fighting a lot of things, weren't you?

Oh, yeah. And so I'm telling him, `Here's a group of people walking down the street, not a smile on their face,` and I'm telling him, `If that was in the western world, those people would be laughing and smiling, telling jokes,` and I said, `You never see that here.`

And he just turned to me and said, `Well, that's the way we are.`

Now later, I put this all to [together]—and this was flying out—it's lack of capitalism. They have *no hope* of improving their status in life or where they are because, one, they don't get to keep

the fruits of their labor. They don't get to do anything with it that they want. And it was interesting, after the fall, when I was going back in doing implementations and stuff, you'd start seeing, from the younger ages, smiles.

Really?

Yeah. The twenty-somethings were starting to smile, but it hadn't worked its way up through the ages yet. So that was an interesting—it really makes—like I came out one time and said, It's capitalism that makes America great. Democracy just allows us to have it. And it was interesting. Oh, I can do this for days.

Whatever direction you want. You have a lot of information. Did you want to start with your pictures?

Yes. What we'll do is I'll go through the pictures. And these are two notebooks of pictures that the Soviets gave me. A lot of them are signed by the Soviets themselves. When various groups were leaving, they would pass on these books to us.

These were pictures that they *took, is that what you—?*

These are pictures that *they* took, or some of our folks took for them and they had additional copies made, and so a lot of these won't show up anywhere else.

So this is when we had the first group of seven, this first bunch here.

OK. Now, where is—they're in a home—

These are taken in model homes. On the weekends, we would take them on trips to try to keep them occupied, gainfully employed, and not trying to find secrets on the test site. I guess I can say that now.

So you kept them busy during the—

We had them 24/7.

Did you ever get a break?

Finally. I started taking them on the weekends because some weekends, I would be with them, and then I had to finally say, `I've got to get a day off.` So it was basically 24/7 because even if I wasn't there, if there was a problem, I'd get the call. So yes. I was usually putting on site about eighty hours a week. We would have meetings in town. One day, for instance, I'd have to leave at—we'd bring people in off an airplane. I'd usually end up getting them set in and bedded down and everything, two o'clock in the morning. Three o'clock in the morning, I'd have to be back up for a meeting in town.

Who met at three o'clock in the morning?

Well, I'd have to leave the test site to make the meeting in town. You know, get up and get ready to go. And so we would have these early meetings in town before everybody else had to do their regular job in town, and then I'd go back out to the test site and make sure I was there in time for the three o'clock.

So you didn't get much sleep either, then.

No.

They needed a young one, didn't they?

They did, and they about burned him out.

[00:20:00] *And you did that pace for how many months?*

Basically from April till August. August, it slowed down, but we still had them around and they slowly went back to the test site, and then I went out to *their* test site and did another six weeks there.

Was it Frances Guinn and you—Ernie Williams, was he a part of what—?

He was part of the support. We had Ernie Williams supporting, Frances Guinn supporting, a *lot* of folks in town supporting. And you have to remember, in addition to doing this, Vern Witherill who was the director of the test site, he went to the Soviet Union. So now, I'm director of the test site, too. I've got a billion dollar budget to manage everything in the test site, plus implementing this treaty, plus supporting the work going on in the Soviet Union, because we had to ship stuff back and forth all the time.

Were the others equally as busy as you were?

I don't think so. I think they got the glory and I got the work. But no, I don't think there was anybody else *as* busy, but there was a *lot* of people working, and I wouldn't have been able to do this without having competent people.

Part of your team.

Part of our team. I say I did all the work but yeah, I did it, but I did it through a lot of other folks that were *good*. I could say, `You go do this,` and it happened. And I didn't have to follow up and—

I understand Frances Guinn was one that was kind of a right hand person for you.

Yes. Right and left sometimes. But we had also a lot of lab guys and the contractor guys. It was hard later on, after JVE, we ended up implementing the treaty. Well, now along comes this other organization called OSIA that says, `But we're going to be the lead. We're going to implement it.` Now we ended up losing our slots of people that we could take to the Soviet Union, and it was even harder. And I, over and over again, had to push to these guys, `We have volunteers. These are civilians, scientists; some of the few in the country that can do this that are volunteering their time to risk their lives to implement this treaty.`

Why wouldn't they let you use them?

Well, because they wanted to be in charge. They wanted to say, We're going to work you guys forty-eight hours a day.

And I'm going, No, no, no. You're not going to put *our* guys' lives at risk.

Again, if you talk about the nuclear physicists in the country that had ever tested a device, we're down to six. You risk one of their lives to do this stuff, then it was nuts. And they were military, and they have different rules and regulations than civilians, so it was hard to train this organization on how to do it. But they had convinced the powers that be in Washington that they should be in charge of implementing the treaty, and so we had to train them.

Was this under Clinton or was this under—?

This was under Bush, the first Bush.

It was under Bush.

And, they don't get involved in this level of detail, and in defense of the OSIA. They had been implementing the INF treaty, and that was a military-to-military type thing.

Was the OSIA, were they less *technical or—?*

Oh, yeah.

They were less technically knowledgeable, then.

Yes.

And that was one of the problems.

That was one of the big problems.

And then the fact that they thought they could just step in and do *what technical people had—*

When the treaty, JVE, was negotiated, we knew we needed a certain number of people. We gave up some of those slots to the intelligence, and then now comes the OSIA people, without any technical competence, and now we're losing four more slots to *their* people. Actually more.

They're going over there and they don't have the technical expertise to do any monitoring whatsoever, so they're going to stand around and look important?

Yes.

Is that really *what it ended up being?*

It was *so* bad at one of the coordinating groups, and this is where we would actually implement to do a test when we were in the Soviet Union, OSIA guys in charge, and I'm sitting next to them as the technical head. And the Soviets were similar. They had their technical people there, Ministry of Atomic Energy people. Viktor Mikhailov, who is the minister, like our Secretary of Energy, with one of the generals that's in charge of the site. The OSIA person starts the meeting, addresses the general, a one-star general—

As if he's in charge.

—instead of the secretary, and I'm going, Oh, my God. It was just those kinds of things that just left us hanging many times.

[00:25:00] *When you talk about implementing, you said "slots." Does that mean that they retained the forty-five limits, limited number of people? Is that kind of what you're talking about when you're saying "implemented it," that Americans go over there—*

And we have this many slots that we can put people in. And the same thing when they come over here.

And so you're having too many cooks and not enough workers.

Yes.

With other agencies wanting to come in and have their presence be the one in charge.

Yes.

Well, you're shedding some interesting light on the problems, even aftermath.

Oh, yes. It was lovely.

[Looking at photographs from this point]

I can't remember his name, but this was the gentleman that was technically in charge of the geological data gathering that was going on initially during the JVE.

That's another thing. We don't have a list of names of the Russian teams.

There are lists somewhere.

But not declassified.

They're in my attic.

They're not declassified, or maybe, like you said, some of the paperwork was put together after the fact. Maybe this was just things that didn't make it into the archives at all.

Could be. Let's see if I have some names here. But some of these folks came back. This is Michael Farafonov .

The translator.

Translator. And he came back. Alex Shmatov.

Our KGB guy.

Our KGB guy. Talked English as good as you and me. Grew up in New York. His dad worked for the Russian Embassy.

I'm trying to remember his name [tapping on photo]. Because he continued on in the organization. Actually, during implementation, he had a daughter born that had a heart problem.

That's the one.

That's the one.

You told that story of how she had heart problems and how the Americans worked together to help her to get the surgery that she needed.

Vadim Smirnov . Vadim. Yeah. And so when I saw him later, ten years later at the reunion, he was there, and he's turned into an alcoholic. At this time, he was young, energetic. It's so sad.

That's common, though, with people over there, though, isn't it?

You want another story on alcoholism? While we were trying to move the equipment out of the test site after JVE, we were negotiating and they're negotiating in Geneva. And so we're sitting there waiting from day to day, and then finally we get the word, `Well, we're going to ship some of it on rail, but not the drill rig.` So they bring in their equipment that are called tank haulers, and they're hauling the equipment to the rail yard. But we're negotiating and we're saying, `Well, why can't we start early in the day?` Because we couldn't get started till ten o'clock in the morning. And by this time, I had built up a really good rapport. They would share stuff with me that they wouldn't tell anybody else. And basically it got down to they couldn't start because they had to put coolant into their equipment once it warmed up enough in the day. And I said, `Well, why don't you use antifreeze and keep something in it all the time?`

[And they said] `We can't leave antifreeze in the equipment because the soldiers drink it all.`

So they're drinking—

Anything.

Poison, basically, was the kind of alcohol they were drinking, just to get the alcohol. So all their military equipment, they're draining it at night so it wouldn't freeze and refilling the radiators the next day.

Those are things you don't find in the books either.

No, those are the kinds of things you don't find.

[C.McWilliam1] So that was the original group. That's Frances [Guinn].

Where's Frances?

Right here [C.McWilliam2].

OK.

I think these pictures go into a trip we took. This is Viktor Mikhailov. After he came in—

Well, you know what? I'm going to put this [number one sticker] here and then I'm going to put a number two here because we've got Frances here. Oh, well, maybe I'm just saying Viktor Mikhailov—do you mind if I do this?

No. That's fine.

Number three is Viktor. [C.McWilliam3] *OK. Is that Viktor, too?*

No, this is me.

Oh, that's you.

I'm looking at it, who is that guy? Oh, that's me. Through Frances, we arranged a trip to take them to Disneyland on one of the weekends, and this was shortly after Viktor got there, so this is probably two weeks after he's been there. And so we rent a bus and take them to Disneyland.

So he got to go to Disneyland, too.

Yes, so you'll see a lot of pictures that they took, and a lot of it was on the bus. We got a speeding ticket, so of course, they were taking pictures. And there's Alex out there trying to negotiate. [C.McWilliam3a]

[00:30:00] *Shmatov.*

Shmatov, yeah.

Speeding tickets—

Yeah, we're going along the road and I'm going, `Now, why are they taking pictures of all these big overpasses?` Because as you get down into L.A. [Los Angeles] on [Interstate]

15, and I'm going, Why are they taking those pictures? And I realized why when I got over there. So you can see all the pictures they were taking along the way and on the buses and stuff. Apartment buildings and a lot of different places we planned—

They'd never seen anything like this before.

Never. *Never*. At Disneyland, I'll tell you some of the stories. [C.McWilliam4] This is standing in line, waiting to get on board the Star Tours ride. And I'm talking to Viktor there and we're talking back and forth and he's saying, I would *never* stand in line to wait to get on a ride like this. You guys must be *nuts*. We finally get up and go on the ride, go through it, we're getting off, and he says, Let's go get back in line. This ride is—. So that was neat.

Some of the other interesting things is they were *really* surprised at the number of foreigners that are in Disneyland, all the German-speaking, the French-speaking, from all over the world because, again, they were top scientists. They were basically locked in their laboratories and their housing areas, and never knew what the rest of the world was. They believed that they were living higher than the rest of the world, that their living standard was *better* than the rest of the world.

And they got surprised.

When I came out, I told people, It's Mexico without the smiles. And that was the big difference. So they were really, really surprised. Actually, with this first group of seven, we would take them out—this is one of the things that shocked them. We took them out to the grocery stores to buy things, you know, like on their daily trip, they'd take a bus trip somewhere, and they'd walk around and say, Oh, this is a show you put on for us. You planted this.

They actually said that to you.

They actually said that. They did *not* believe that Americans shopped in grocery stores. And it was the Smith's on [Interstate] 95 that is closed now , on Jones and 95, that Smith's shopping center that's closed, that was the one. So we said, `Well, we'll take you to some other grocery stores.`

We took them to a few others and they say, `No, you guys are just putting on this show for us. This *can't* be the way you guys live.`

So we said, `Pull out a phone book. You pick one and we'll go there.`

And finally, after a couple *weeks* of this, they finally found out that we go in a supermarket, buy anything we want. If you want to see a good movie, see *Moscow on the Hudson* because, oh, what's his name that plays in that? *Mork and Mindy.*

Robin Williams?

Robin Williams is the Russian that comes to America, and you'll see him go in the grocery store and try and buy coffee, and all these different brands of coffee, and he can't make a decision. That was one of the Soviets' big problems, even in doing any negotiating, is they couldn't make decisions, one. Two, they were always afraid of making decisions because if they made the wrong one, they may get axed, literally. And so those kind of issues were always a problem in negotiating with them. They'd always have to go back and check with somebody.

You didn't do as much checking as they did?

No, we could make decisions right there on the ground.

They gave you a lot of authority, then, didn't they?

Well, nobody knew what to do. So without *anybody* knowing what to do, Viktor and I were negotiating right then on the ground what was going to happen. We documented it and went back to Geneva, and Geneva wrote it up.

You said Viktor was head of one of the labs, and yet it was not *one of the heads of the labs that was actually negotiating with him.*

Right.

Why didn't one of the heads of the labs do this?

That's a good question. Probably because—and this is a big role. If Troy Wade would've stayed back there, things would've been different. But Troy Wade's interacting in the U.S. government, and Jim Magruder's saying, `We can do this.` Of course, I did it, but those were the guys that made it happen. Once we got started implementing, Troy Wade wasn't there. Jim didn't take the job [in Washington D. C.] that Troy Wade wanted him to. Otherwise, Jim would have been there [in Washington D. C.] and we would have still been in charge. And we can talk about how the U.S. government does things in their interagencies but it's a—

You really stepped up to the plate in a very key moment in time, didn't you?

[00:35:00] Yeah.

You just said, I want to do it. I'm not afraid. I don't have a problem doing it.

Yes.

And you were thirty-eight years old.

Yes.

So the future of these two countries rests in the hand of a thirty-eight-year-old. And how old is Viktor Mikhailov?

He was probably fifty, I guess.

They had a lot of trust in you.

I think so.

That's remarkable.

Yes. [C.McWilliam4a] These are just various pictures of Disneyland. There's Viktor standing in front of the whale at one of the rides. We went to a hotel that night, then we had dinner together and stuff, then the next day, we took them to the beach.

The beach?

Most of them had never seen the Pacific Ocean.

But they did have swimming suits.

Yes. We told them ahead of time we were going to do this.

So they bought the swimming suits in Las Vegas, is that—?

Or they had them with them, because they would spend time at the pool in Mercury.

OK.

[C.McWilliam5] There they are, building castles.

They really *liked that, didn't they?*

Oh, yeah.

I've heard someone else say, `We didn't realize how much it meant to them until later on`.

Oh, yes. I was in Geneva, negotiating, oh, implementation, and I'm having to deal with all our U.S. government, other interagencies, and with an ambassador who was actually on our side, negotiating with the Soviet ambassador. They're going through some step process, and I don't even remember what it was, but us two sides were at loggerheads. We couldn't agree. And so I asked the ambassador, `Can I speak?` And so I went through all the steps of why we wanted to do what we were doing, and the Soviets agreed. `OK.` We got out later and the Office of the Secretary of Defense guy was a captain in the Navy. He turns to me and said, `Smoke and`

mirrors. It wasn't that. They trusted me. They knew what I said was the truth and that's what it was going to be and they just trusted—

They had a relationship with you, and that's what made things go—

On the last coordinating group meeting, let's see, General Safanov, but it wasn't Safanov. It'll come to me. But the general that had been promoted was now a head of the test site [Semipalatinsk] in Kazakhstan. We were asking for photographic support. He says, Can't do it. So we leave it. We do our thing and we leave the meeting. He calls me in afterwards, one on one.

He says, We can't provide you photographic support because we don't have the capability. It's not here.

And I said, Well, in that case, we'll bring it.

And you solved the problem.

Solved the problem. He was too embarrassed. He didn't want to say it in front of the rest of the group that they didn't have the resources available.

They did seem to reach a way where they could tell Americans that we can't do something when they said, We can't drill the hole.

But that was after they had tried three times. So it wasn't something that—

So they realized that it's not—some people they could trust enough that it wasn't a shameful thing to say, We can't do some things.

And there's others that just wouldn't.

And they probably saw your problem solving [attitude]: Well, let's solve the problem. Let's not attack. We're not in this to make the other person feel bad. All we're trying to do is solve problems.

Right. To get a job done. And they recognized that.

I guess that is what the JVE, the document, kind of shows, too. These are the problems. It doesn't necessarily have to be your way or my way, but what works.

Yes. Let's get together.

So that you had a lot of building of that kind of relationship, then.

Yes.

[This is] Them at the beach. You said since they didn't smile. Was this probably kind of an element of fun [for them]. It made them feel like kids again?

Yes. That's exactly what it did. It really loosened them up.

So it sounds like the Soviets, the way they loosened themselves up [normally], was more with alcohol.

Oh, yes.

And the Americans are more, Let's find ways to have fun, and maybe even some humor, some pranks, that they have a different way of loosening up, then.

Yes. And they can put away the booze. I used to have to start my first glass, it'd be water, and they wouldn't know it.

Well, if you don't have anything else, you don't have anything else that's fun in life, what else do you do? You're so wound up.

Yes.

[00:40:00] *So you probably worked on unwinding these guys on the weekend, then, didn't you?*

Yes, that we did. [C.McWilliam6] [Nikolai] Voloshin. Remember, he's actually been number two to Viktor, and still was the last time—

How do you say—?

Voloshin.

Voloshin. You've got a nice group of photographs here. I should put my numbers on here because you've got a whole group of—well, let's just go back—since it's all related, I'll just put five on the beach ones. They do look like they had fun.

They did. And at the three o'clock meeting on the Monday after this, thanked us. [Referring to more photographs] There's some more group shots.

Is that Frances Guinn?

Yes, that's Frances Guinn. She's there.

Nick [Aquilina] said that they really liked Frances. They liked American women.

Well, that's one thing about women all through the world.

Is that Nick?

That's Voloshin. He was being a good guy. Went around the bus down to Los Angeles and I'm briefing them, you know, `This is the City of Angels. That's what Los Angeles means.` And he speaks up and says, `I guess Los Alamos must be the City of Devils.`We stopped the bus in a place in Hollywood where there was a European electronics store, because VCRs [videocassette recorders] had a different format than they do in the States. Well, this outfit sold them. They got paid based on how many days they were here, so they just saved all their money, since we were providing all their food and everything, and they just did without anything else. So they saved it all and they bought a whole bunch of electronics. You can see them loading up the bus here [C.McWilliam7] to take back. And what they would do is sell it over there, on the black market, for tons of money. Because they just couldn't get it. And I didn't *realize* they were going to do that till later.

Ah, baseball [C.McWilliam8]. We got them to play in the softball teams at night. So one of the things in the three o'clock meeting we're discussing is they're asking how we play baseball. You ever try to explain the game of baseball?

How do you hit with the bat and—

So we went through this and we kind of explained it, and they went out and did it and had a ball.

Did they gain some skills?

Yes, they gained some skills and they started playing.[C.McWilliam8a]

Did they ever win a game or was it just good-natured?

No. They would then mix them up. They wouldn't put them all on one team. But they'd run the wrong bases, go this way different. It's really funny when you talk to grown people and you say, How do you play baseball? [C.McWilliam8b] Boy, I have to back up and figure out how to do that. But one of the interesting things is they have in *their* mind that *they* are all for the group, all for the mother country; while Americans are all for individuals.

So after we did this, I explained to them, `No, Americans are kind of like baseball. We have a team we're all for, but we each individually get to stand up at bat. And although we're hitting for ourselves, we're also hitting for the team. And that's why Americans are individualists, but they're still working for something else.`

So you didn't feel like they had a sense of individualism?

Some of them did. Viktor did. He did. One of these nights in between Disney and on the beach, when we were sitting over a drink, he's explaining that when he grew up in World War II, he was a kid, and the Germans came in and killed his parents. So he grew up as an orphan. But he can remember as a kid, running through the woods, throwing dynamite and stuff at the Germans, fighting through the forests, and this is as a ten-year-old kid. So it was interesting to hear him

say how he grew up, and I finally I told him, You're a capitalist. You just don't know it.

*[He said]*No, Communist.

Because we'd go on and on about it. Yeah, that's right.

We would go on at night, when we'd bring people in, he and I'd have a drink and boy, it was, I'm a Communist.

[And I'd say] No, you're really a capitalist. You just don't know it. But *I'm* a capitalist, for sure.

[00:45:00] *They probably did have a real strong tie to their nation, quite a strong identity as an ethnic—*

Yeah. Oh, *shooo!*

I get it.

And you talk about prejudice. Oh, geez.

Tell me what you saw.

I'll tell you this one story. We were in Nakhodka. Now, we're clear across the Soviet Union. And we're having dinner in the restaurant of the hotel. It also doubled as a nightclub and dance thing and all this. So we're in there eating with our escorts, and in walks this guy, and just looks like everybody else to me. And the guy next to me says, That's a Georgian. Hate them. They're terrible people. I couldn't tell he was Georgian. He looks like every other Russian. I mean, so they knew ethnics much differently than we do. And if they were Kazakhstan or any of these other countries, republics at that point—

They were lower than dirt.

Oh, yes.

Is that one of the reasons why they had their nuclear testing in Kazakhstan, because Kazakhstan was kind of down at the bottom of the pole?

I think so. But that was interesting. And then we used to take them up to Mount Charleston for a weekend.[C.McWilliam9]

Picnics.

Picnics. Do picnics.

You did what Americans do. You treat them like part of an extended family.

Yes. And they're all interested in cars because none of them had cars, so here he- I think he was also KGB. There he is in the BMW. [C.McWilliam10]

I understand once, word got back at how well these people were getting treated, that your people got treated lots better.

Our people got treated a lot better. I mean, again, they didn't have the resources to bring them up to *our* standards. And that treatment *really* didn't start getting better until their general came over from *their* test site. And then he *saw* the way we were treating the people here, and he immediately called back to *their* folks. Because their test site was run by the military and their Ministry of Atomic Energy worked at the labs and were just kind of *users* on the site, where ours was run by the civilians, which made it a little bit different.

Larry Neese said that their treatment was nothing like what they got over here.

No. This guy was another KGB guy, we figured [[C.McWilliam11]. What was his name? But he learned to speak English by listening to our music, and one of his favorites was the Beach Boys, so I bought him a Beach Boys tape one time and gave it to him. When he was going back to the Soviet Union, I gave him that Beach Boys tape.

That's good music. Beach Boys. Did they comment on the desert, the mountains, the trees? Did they say anything about it resembling anything back—?

They liked the trees, especially Viktor, because Viktor used to talk to me all the time about home because it reminded him of the birch trees around Moscow.

Did you see resemblances when you went to Moscow? You did see the birch trees.

Oh, yes, I saw lots of birch trees. But it's not mountainous like this. It's hill and plains type. Even what they call mountains, we would call, out West, hills. Anyway, back east, they might call them mountains. [C.McWilliam11a] Alex [Shmatov [Using picture of Shmatov and Frances Guinn to preserve anonymity] That's one of our guys. [person on right of C.McWilliam11a] He was actually CIA. And he almost ended up going nuts, he was putting in so much time.

Really?

You probably don't want to say anything about him.

Well, OK. Well, since you pointed him out, I'll just put that—but you're saying that the stress of working that many hours affected some people.

Pretty much got to—yes. Oh, yes. Some of our interpreters that would come, we'd use them for a week and they'd burn out, `I can't do this anymore.`

What kept you going?

I just had the drive.

Do you still have it?

Oh, it's slowed way down as a matter of fact.

Farafonov, it got to the point that we could not find a good technical U.S. interpreter.

Is that him right there [C.McWilliam12]*?*

[00:50:00] Yes. In a minute, you'll see there's a lot of pictures of him. But that's him right there.

I'll just put Farafonov here.

He ended up having to interpret for both sides because we could not find technical interpreters. He said he studied nuclear testing language six months before he came over, just so he'd be able to do it. There's so many things that we would take for granted that—

[C.McWilliam13] He was DOE security.

Did they reach a point where they were allowed to go into homes, like Nick Aquilina's home?

Nick was the *only* home that they were able to go into.

Did they have to get special permission for that?

Yes. Nick had to go to Washington and get special permission to do that. Closest they got to *my* house is when we came back from the Disneyland trip late at night; I had the bus drop me off at the front of the house, on the street, on their way out to the test site, since I lived out that side of town.

Did they say why it was that they were exercising that caution?

There were *so* many cautions exercised. And again, after going through all this, *our* intelligence didn't have a clue of the Soviet capability. They didn't have a clue what they were doing. Half of the Cold War was probably make-believe because both sides wanted it, just to keep their people united. Not that their military wasn't good, but they couldn't have stood up to a—.

[referring to a picture]Those tank haulers. They would come in brand new, still got the rubber tits on the tires. They would come in and make one trip. By the time they'd turn around and go back, the *oil* would be dripping out of them. They'd be adding oil and coolant. They couldn't run a hundred miles without falling apart.

Are you saying those are Soviet tanks?

Those are Soviet—the tank haulers. This is the equipment they put the tanks on and move them.

So you're saying their equipment was totally inferior and that the Soviet Union only had an image of being scary?

They had an image. Remember I said that they didn't believe our supermarket? Well, what you find out is all through Soviet history, they have put on a show. And there's even clothing that the tsars used to wear that they'd put silver thread on the front and nothing on the back. Then he'd always hold his front—that's where that term come from, you put on a good front. It comes from them, because that's what they used to do. Used to be the tourists would go through Moscow, they had certain streets that the tourists could go down. Well, after we got to know these people a little bit and after various—we were going to the *back* streets and seeing the drunks laying on the ground, and I mean it was—so it's—

So they only put their best foot forward. In your opinion, then, the kinds of information that our intelligence agencies was trying to get, do you think it was inferior?

I don't know if it was inferior or they just didn't know how to get it or gather it.

There's nothing like openness, is there, for getting to the truth.

Yeah. As an example, we were in one of our three o'clock meetings when Viktor was trying to exert himself as being all-powerful. And this was really odd. He said, `We have brought the brightest and best of the Soviet Union here and we're going to run all over you.`

Well, I think Roger Hill was the Los Alamos guy at the time, Ph.D. physicist, and I turned to him, `Here we are, just a bunch of cowboys out here negotiating.`

Troy Wade had said that the agreement was that they were not supposed to be hand picked. They were supposed to be just ordinary guys getting together, but that the Soviets didn't follow that, and they sent their very, very best.

They did.

But that the United States hadn't. They didn't necessarily pick out the Ph.D.s to do this negotiating.

Yes. But it turned out that in the real world, the numbers of people that could do this was so limited that they had to be their best. It was just all there was. Except we didn't put a lab director out there negotiating. They didn't have time to do that.

Some of their *macho*ism [C.McWilliam14]. [picture of a Soviet arm wrestling with an American woman]

And they definitely were very *macho*. Different world. In that same scene where I was telling you we saw the people, the Georgians, come in, in that same environment I saw guys just *beat* women up and nobody do anything about it. It was **[00:55:00]** hard to believe. You would never see that happen in the States. Every guy in the bar would stand up and at least hold the guy back, if not beat *him* up.

Lots of picnic pictures [looking through photographs]. We were changing out groups of people, because they would come and go, and the Soviets would have people come and go, so we'd take *another* group to Disneyland.

Was this another group that went there [C.McWilliam15]? Is that Disneyland again?

Yes.

I'll just go ahead and put number fifteen on there, because that's your second group. You said at one time you had thirty people from the Soviet Union.

And this is the general of their test site.[C.McWilliam16]

Il'enko?

[Arkadii D.] Il'enko. He was the head of their test site. This guy was actually Viktor's boss [C.McWilliam17]. Yuri. And he was doing a lot of the negotiations in Geneva.

Was he Troy Wade's counterpart?

He would have been Troy Wade's counterpart.

Pushkin. Palenykh?

No, not—I'd have to see the names. I know it's Yuri something, and I can't remember—

And again, they went to the beach, too [showing photographs]. They did all the kind of stuff that we had done with Viktor on the first time.

Could I call this the—?

Book number two.

Book two. OK, and this is their signature there?[C.William18]

This is all their signatures. This, again, was a gift from them. I think it was when *this* group was leaving, they presented me with this at one of the meetings, again, being the negotiator. So every night they ate in the Steakhouse. Every night, somebody'd leave or come. I have got to be there for the dinner and do the presentations and that kind of stuff, so it was—

It probably was good for them to identify with one person throughout their stay, though.

Yes. Since I was a branch chief, they kind of treat that as their bear, and the bear is their person in charge, so they gave me a statue, a wooden statue of a bear carrying something on its back, and signed the bottom and said, `To the Chief`.

And then we went out to the Red Rock [Canyon], the farm out there, the ranch, [Howard] Hughes's old ranch [Spring Mountain Ranch]. But that was out there [C.McWilliam19]. This was up at Mount Charleston, at the lodge [C.McWilliam20]. This was at a different—

Twenty. [Referring to number given to photographs]

[Looking through photographs] I've got more of Mount Charleston. Another guy that played an important role all the way through, even in implementation, I'm trying to think of his name [C.McWilliam21].

You know what his name is? Twenty-one is just a Soviet—

Katie's [Katie McWilliam] probably talking about his guy [C.McWilliam22]. He was another military type, and when we were negotiating at this coordinating group in Moscow or Geneva, I don't remember which, he did something that was sexually not right and so she had to file a complaint against him with the ambassador.

Oh, is that Katie?

Yes. That was Katie.

And so she had an experience that was unpleasant with him.

Yeah, because he was the seismic guy and she was the seismic….

So she was a counterpart, and so he made a pass at her, which wasn't very nice?

Yes.

I bet he was surprised somebody spoke up about that.

Yes, they don't understand that. There's one of the times I'm handing out awards or something to the various people before they leave [C.McWilliam23].

That was twenty-four. Looks like a barbeque here [referring to another photograph].

Yes, it was, as a matter of fact. This was on a weekend, so I had my kids with me. I had to drop them off one place in this park so I could go and do this, because I couldn't **[01:00:00]** have them fraternizing with my kids.

Really.

Yeah. Couldn't do it.

It was difficult for you to have a family life, too, then, wasn't it?

Now, was this before you married Katie?

Yes. I had another wife at this time.

I bet she didn't see much of you either.

No, she didn't. That's another long story.

A lot of times, we filled in their weekends when they weren't busy doing technical—

This is a park ranger, and Yuri took to her. [C.McWilliams25]

[C.McWilliam29] That's when we'd take them to the malls and stuff and shopping.

There he is again. [C.McWilliam26] Can't leave her alone.

She is *cute. Now, that's a different person there [C.McWilliam26].*

Oh, yes, that's Frances. Her name, I'm blanking on it right now. She was another DOE. She was a fed.

OK. That was twenty-six.

And this was one of their hydrodynamic specialists [C.McWilliam27]. Computer wizard. He learned *his* English from doing computers.

Now, that's you, right [C.McWilliam27a]?

That's me, yes. Didn't have *quite* as much gray hair then.

That's you, too [pointing to photograph].

Yep.

And that's Viktor.

That's Viktor. [C.McWilliam28] Always had a cigarette in his mouth. *I'll put twenty-eight.*

Yeah, at the ten-year reunion thing, he wouldn't come in with everybody else because they were put on a U.S. airline and there was no smoking on U.S. airlines, so he flew on an Aeroflot that still had smoking, so he could still smoke.

They could still do that. Well, let me go ahead and flip—

All right, now, we're still looking at book number two.

Yes, we're still going through picnics. Here's another picnic up at Mount Charleston, in Red Rock. And we'd take them shopping, because they could not believe - and I didn't realize how bad it was until I went *there* and tried to go shopping and found out. If you wanted something there, you needed to buy it on the black market because it wasn't in the stores.

Ronshaugen, Steve Ronshaugen, was one of our guys.

I remember he's on one of the lists. You want to tell me about him?

The second bus tour that went down, he took the lead on that. We still had people working, so I was still at the test site, so everybody didn't go on that second—just the new arrivals went. The people that *had* been working stayed and worked. So he took a bunch down there, and they almost got busted on the beach. You can see him arguing. [C.McWilliam30]

What were they getting busted for?

I think drinking on the beach.

Was that Ron [Ronshaugen] or was it the Soviets?

Well, they were going to bust the whole group.

So he had to explain—

They're Soviets. They get to drink.

They don't know about not drinking. You can see sometimes they look real tough, and other times he kind of softens up By the end when I went to their test site, he was just bending over backwards to make things—

What was his name again?

Il'enko. [C.McWilliam31]

General Il'enko. I think he was Nick Aquilina's counterpart, wasn't he?

Yes, he was Nick Aquilina's counterpart. See, here's one of the typical nights when there's a group leaving, we'd give them memorabilia [C.McWilliam33].

OK. Thirty-three.

And T-shirts and stuff. That was another general [C.McWilliam34]. He was doing a lot of the Geneva negotiations.

They tend to like gifts, didn't they? Gift giving. That seemed to be a big thing with them.

Yes, usually, when I was giving out gifts, they'd also give me gifts that they would bring over to give out. There's a number of things in the Soviet culture is, one, you drink with somebody, they're your friends for life, and if you like him, you give him a gift. But they have to reciprocate.

Doesn't even have to be an expensive gift, either, does it? Just a little memento, token, or something.

The big thing is drinking with them. Once you drink with them….

So they don't do too well with teetotalers, then.

No.

Did you have any in your group that were teetotalers?

Yes. Another one Guy Allen was Mormon, and he went over to the Soviet Union, and in between him and Vern Witherill, they were doing most of the onsite rep at the Soviet Union. Well, they hated Guy, because he wouldn't drink. Vern they loved because Vern would drink. But, you're not supposed to—

Turn it down?

Oh, no, that's the kiss of death.

I understand, though, if they know you're doing it for religious reasons, they're a little more forgiving.

Yeah, but don't believe it. They don't forgive that easy. You have to remember, especially at this time, their religion was not very open, and so where *these* guys lived, there was no religion because that town was *built* only for testing under the Soviet era. In Moscow, they still had some churches left.

So no one suggested that they go to church on the weekends, I guess, then.

No. No, that was not one of the things we could do.

Well, it's interesting. They took pictures of a cow. [C.McWilliam35]

Yeah, when they were on that ranch out there. Bonnie Springs.

Bonnie Springs?

It's not Bonnie Springs, but it's right *next* to Bonnie Springs. I almost had it. It's the one Howard Hughes owned at one time. [Looking at photographs] I should remember these names. Boy. I tell you, when we did the ten year reunion thing, it had been ten years and I had forgotten so much that, without having to go back and review a lot of things, it was tough.

I understand there were a lot of presentations at that ten-year reunion.

Yes. And I think that's all on video.

Is it?

I think we videotaped all those presentations, because I gave one there, too, and there should be one somewhere that documents this.

[00:05:00] *Well, that would be interesting, because Nick couldn't remember if there had been—*

Ask Frances. Put that on your list for Frances, because she should either have it available or have it around.

OK.

These are just some of the little trinkets that they gave me.

And there's Farafonov. [C.McWilliam36]

Farafonov. Shmatov. [C.McWilliam37]

Shmatov! You talk about him a lot. S-H-M-A-T-O-V. And he was your KGB agent.

OK, and these [referring to other photographs] are from a later period. These are from the first coordinating group that we did in Moscow. That's Katie and I back when we were at a swap meet.

Oh, can I see her? She's been so nice on the phone. Now, which one's Katie?

She's Katie [pointing on photograph].

OK.

And that's Katie. Another one here. That's her. This is at, oh, what was that park called? The park in Moscow that they had swap meets, and basically the Soviets were getting all their money under the table, the black market.

She got to visit Moscow, too, then.

Because she went in on the first coordinating group.

What year was that?

That would've been '89.

So then, that was the implementing group, is that—?

That was one of the implementing groups.

Well, it's nice that you got to be there together. Were you married at that time?

No.

Was how you met, then, was through the JVE?

Yes After the JVE.

Well, then, JVE's kind of sentimental for you.

Oh, yes. That's true. There's Voloshin [C.McWilliam38].

Let me put down this. Thirty-eight. Voloshin.

He's the one that was Viktor Mikhailov's number two guy.

Number two guy.

Number two guy, right. And he was his right-hand man.

That's always nice to see how those names are spelled, with your business cards like that.

This, again, is the coordinating group, and this is the head table [showing another photograph].

Coordinating—is that one of your three o'clock meetings?

No, this is *after* JVE, when we're implementing. We will go over these later, but I was just seeing that—this one's good for you to keep somewhere in here, since Voloshin was involved in the whole thing. Oh, just souvenirs. VIP on Aeroflot.

You did say that there were no assigned seats and you just kind of got pushed from place to place.

You just got pushed on and—

And you got shoved by a big babushka.

Babushka. She took care of me and took me up and put me on the airplane, and that was *this* trip. This was actually when we—was that this trip? No, this was the bigger trip. It was this trip.

Here we've got book number three, right?

Book number three.

Thirty-nine is book number three.

I was going in to take over from Guy Allen, who was the lead negotiator at the test site in Kazakhstan. but because of the limits of the numbers [of] people they could have there, and we had all the tourists there for the actual shot of Shagan, I had to wait till the day *after* Shagan, when all the tourists left, so I could go in. So I was stuck in Frankfurt on the day Shagan was shot. So I went around and played tourist around and all over and took—

And so then, you had to hang around after Shagan to do a lot of the follow-up work.

To get everything out. Yes.

Again, they couldn't find anybody else to do that. You were doing the test site with Kearsarge and you also had—but they just couldn't do very well without you, could they?

Not very well, because I knew it all.

It was all in your lap.

Most of the equipment, I had shipped over, arranged for all the shipping. There was one point when they were trying to drill the hole over there. They were going through drill bits right and left, and so they were out of drill bits, so we had to ship a new kind of drill bit over, and these come in forty-foot lengths, drill pipe. Well, it wouldn't fit on a C-5, so we had to cut them in half to get them on the C-5. And an Air Force general, it would take him two months to get a C-5 **[00:10:00]** scheduled. We scheduled it in a week.

You were implementing the project plan, is that what you're saying?

Yes.

The book, the fifty, sixty page plan.

Right. And all the words in between that you don't see in the plan. Because we'd have to make sure things happened to implement that, and everything's not in there.

Since you *had been the one that had sat down and* knew *what the agreements were, you didn't have time to relay all that information to a new person, so they just let you carry it from beginning to end, then.*

Right. Pretty much. And yet, you have to remember, while this is going on, I'm running the test site, I'm implementing the treaty on the U.S. territory, and then I'm supporting the U.S. team that is implementing the treaty in the Soviet Union. So all the equipment they need, I'm shipping over there. And somewhere in those documents, you'll see where all the equipment's being loaded on C-5s at Indian Springs to ship it out there. Well, we're doing that from this end, too.

I saw that. Yes, and they're having photo opportunities for journalists, trying to get publicity that's favorable, to help change the image of the test site.

Yep. So I'm going into Moscow all by myself. No escorts, no translators, no nothing. So after I played tourist in Germany, I get on the airplane in Frankfurt and go on into Moscow, and there meet up with some of the ministry people who take me out to dinner, and then I meet one of our intelligence folks. She walks me around Moscow and, of course, people are following us, and she's giving me all the briefing, not to talk to anybody and be careful out here and all that kind of stuff. [C.McWilliam40] So here's Lenin's tomb. That's not there anymore. And here's some pictures of St. Basil's. [C.McWilliam41] I've got some other ones, and later I had, on another trip in, the intelligence community, since I was taking pictures everywhere, they were blowing them all up for us. Some of these pictures are also official, so they'll show up—

I seem to remember something like that.

This is *our* drill rig in the Soviet Union. [C.McWilliam42]

This is forty-two.

And I don't know if Nick told you, but Vern had them raise the U.S. and Soviet flag up on our drill rig over there, [C.McWilliam42a] so we had to raise it up over *here* on our drill rig.

That was in your video.

Was it? Nick, was fit to be tied. *He* was not happy about that. For *me*, it was an emotional thing, because until we raised that flag, these were just people. Now, I grew up going through the Cuban missile crisis. I'm a little kid. I remember watching TV with Khrushchev beating the table, `We're going to bury you`. So I'm fighting the Evil Empire all these years, and when that Soviet flag went up on the test site, it just [snapped fingers], `What are we doing?`

We just handed it over to the enemy.

Yes.

Well, you got past that.

Yes. We got past that, but it took me a few days, even just sitting down across from them, to emotionally get past—

Well, you said that the drillers *had painted the drill rig red, white, and blue. Now, was that their way of saying, We're going to keep America. You may not get as far as you think you're going to get.*

Yes, I think so. There was a lot of things we had to—with the roughnecks and the miners and all that—that had to be *really* careful, *real*, real careful because—and you also had to worry about the Soviet safety. That was really a—

That was a genuine concern, then.

Oh, yeah.

That someone might get out of line and hurt them.

And do something. Oh, yeah.

Well, you had said that the Soviets felt a little bit like Americans would be out to get them.

Yeah.

It wasn't just protesters. It was test site people, too, that you were—

No. Right. That we were working with. I mean, every day. And they were out on the test site.

Any close calls?

We had one time somebody, having too much to drink and threatening them. But hauled him away and—it didn't get to anything physical, but the verbal thing was there.

This is their test site [showing photographs], and I don't know how many of these pictures you're going to see in the official files.

[Looking at photographs] None. Absolutely none. And this is their test site right here?

If you can get to him—his wife just died—

Fred Huckabee.

Fred Huckabee. So if you can to him, he's a sweetheart.

[00:15:00] *I heard about Fred Huckabee. But his wife just died, then?*

It's been about a year-and-a-half now.

Well, maybe he's willing to talk.

He might. Because he loved this. I used to tell him we need—well, I'd tell the Soviets this because—We need a translator to translate Texan into English, and another one to translate English into Russian when he was talking. But this was actually at their

test site, near their nuclear lake, the one they made with a nuclear weapon, and they put out hay bales, put a tablecloth over it, and that's what their eating out there. [C.McWilliam43]

That's what you're eating, is on hay bales.

[C.McWilliam44] This was our housing facilities in the Soviet Union.

Let me put a forty-four there. Kind of modest.

This was a *brand* new building they just built. And one of our teams I was coming out with, I said, `Yeah, the Soviets built a brand new building and it looks like it's six hundred years old, and in Germany we were staying in a six-hundred-year-old building that looked brand new.` [C.McWilliam45] So this is a group of us that were in that time. Then here's another guy you may want to talk to. He's still at the test site. Chuck Faughback. He's the paramedic I was telling you about. He's the fire chief out there.

He's one you ought to—he's got lots of memorabilia also. And I don't know if Don Eilers is still around.

Yes, I understand he was the CORRTEX man.

He was the CORRTEX guy.

Forty-six.

He was Dr. CORRTEX. [C.McWilliam46] This is us in front of the nuclear lake, the lake they made with—and we had actually been swimming in it. We had swam across this channel here [pointing on photograph].

And they had let the Shagan River flow into it.

Fill it up. Yep.

So there was fishing there, too?

Yes. They were fishing. We weren't eating it, but they were.

Now, that was the counterpart to—

Sedan.

Sedan. Yes. You wouldn't eat it, but they would. [laughter]

Yes. Hopefully, they weren't feeding it to us. That was my badge while I was there.

Yes. Put forty-seven on that. [C.McWilliam47]

And they also made up three badges for my three kids at the time.

That's nice.

It was. And they weren't supposed to. I mean, the general wouldn't do it, and finally Viktor came around and did it. [C.McWilliam48] Larry Perkle. I think he's still with Los Alamos. That's another name.

Larry Perkle. Put forty-eight.

Here's General Il'enko in his uniform. [C.McWilliam49]

Would they tend to be kind of short?

General Il'enko did. On the Russians on the whole, probably. This is, I want to say, General Safanov [far left of front row].

For some reason, I thought of Russians as being bigger, but they're not.

Yes. We in America have a view of the Russians as being very *macho*. After spending time both in cold, hot, they're wimps. They couldn't work at all in harsh conditions like Americans, not at all. But this is Safanov. He took over from Il'enko on running the test site. He was the one I was telling you about, during our implementation negotiations, came in and says, `We don't have that capability.`

Yes What lake is this?[C.McWilliam50] Is that the—?

This is actually, I'm going to say, the Irtysh River. [Note: This is the correct spelling of Irtysh.]

Irtysh.

Irtysh. This is, oh, what was the name of it? [Showing photograph] We didn't even know what the name of this city was until afterwards. I mean, that's how good the intelligence *wasn't.* But this is running down the roads in the bus [C.McWilliam51]. They'd run a cop car out front, they'd push everybody out of the way, and we'd go by.

Now, this is in the Soviet Union.

This is in Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan. You said that the roads in the Soviet Union were, typically, really*, really, bad.*

Really, really bad.

And that you couldn't go anywhere very fast, and they were rough roads.

Right. And then I say that I couldn't understand, when we were loading their equipment on at Indian Springs, that we had flown in, we couldn't understand why they were so concerned about going slow and tying things down, until I went there and saw. Then I understood.

[C.McWilliam52] Again, another picture of the Irtysh. This is one of *our* guys over there that almost lost—had been there so long, he about went off the deep end.

They couldn't have been there more than ninety days, though, were they?

Yeah. But you would go in there and it'd be like being in a submarine. You would not have any news from the outside. If the whole world disappeared, **[00:20:00]** you would never know it. And our only communications with the outside was *via* fax, and this fax operated at 150 baud if it was lucky.

It means that's really slow.

Really slow. Sometimes 75 baud, which means you-could-watch-the-printer-go-a-cross-the-page, and so you got, maybe a paragraph a day that somebody would send us of the news going on in the world. And so *that's* what kind of makes you go bonkers.

There were no phone calls home. Larry [Neese] had said something about a sixteen-hour time difference to try to call home.

Yeah, and so we would try to schedule a phone call every day, but during this treaty, there was no phone calls home. During the implementation, we had negotiated that there would be time at least once a week for everybody to call home.

You said they gave you a hard time about that, too. It wasn't the Soviets—

The Washingtonians. During that AI meeting in Moscow, where I said we went in to Arzamas, we're in Moscow negotiating with the Soviets, and again, one of the OSD guys, Office of the Secretary of Defense, is saying, `We're not going to let you make phone calls home.` And we're riding on the bus back to the hotel, and I'm going, `No, you have to. If you don't let us make phone calls home, we won't know what's going on. There could be an emergency. You're not going to get people to come.` And we went on and on. I was so sick, I didn't go to dinner that night Although he was a major in the military, he had never been in a front. I mean, he was a politician type and just had never—history major. And he's trying to tell—and again, in my head, I've got this perspective, Here we have the top scientists in the country we're sending over to this remote area and you're not going to let them call home once a week? They're going to *un*-volunteer and you're not going to have anybody. These people are volunteers. They have got another job. They don't need to do this. They're doing this out of dedication to their country, to their lab, to their people. That's the only reason they're doing it. *You've* got to do it because you're ordered to, but they don't.

Yes. We don't. We can quit.

No. And needless to say, I won that argument, but at that point, it was not a nice thing.

[C.McWilliam53] They took *us* on tours. You can see where they took us.

[Laughter] OK, I'll put fifty-three there. No Disneyland.

No Disneyland over there. There was one time we were stuck negotiating, oh, I can't remember which trip it was now, but we finally said, Hey, we're not going anywhere with these negotiations. Why don't you take us to St. Petersburg? We're in Moscow. [And they said] No, we can't do that. Well, we went back and forth a few times but no, they never did.

So you were doing negotiations in Moscow, too?

Yeah.

When was this?

This was after JVE, when we were implementing.

You were one of those that went to follow-up, then.

I have spent more time in Moscow. I've probably spent six months in Moscow all together. [C.McWilliam] This is still out in Kazakhstan. Again, this is the group that went in to—

This church is Kazakhstan, too?

Yes.

Fifty-four. [C.McWilliam54]

[C.McWilliam55] One of our drillers came across two little local kids playing cowboys and Indians.

How interesting.

That was fun. [Looking at photographs] So you can see our tours and trips. In Moscow.

Museums and—

Yeah, museums. They did take us around Moscow.

Very educational. Not the fun end of things.

Right.

[As if the Soviets are saying] `Look how wonderful we are, with our history`

Yeah, `Look at the history.` And this is still the Soviet Union, so this is a Greek Orthodox priest, [C.McWilliam56] and he's running out of his limo to go somewhere. You didn't see very much of that yet, because the religion hadn't really opened up, but there was already an undertone that there was a drive, that there was going to be.

Yes, because Gorbachev's glasnost *was starting to encourage some of that.*

Yes, it was, but it was kind of frictional [rubbing hands together]. It wasn't—

The Orthodox didn't want other religions to compete with them.

To come in. Yeah, that's right.

So their idea of freedom of religion was very exclusive.

Yeah. [Showing other photographs] This is inside the Kremlin. Inside St. Basil's. But they **[00:25:00]** did tour us to some of these sites. [C.McWilliam57] Of course, by now I have seen enough of—[C.McWilliam58] KGB building.

Did they have museums? Is that what fifty-eight is? OK, KGB building.

And these buildings were buildings built under Stalin [referring to other photographs], and I just thought they were kind of all the same architecture and built very sturdy. And this was all souvenir stuff. So this is all from my first trip in, which was to get the equipment ready. Here we are back out in —we're in Germany now.

Is that you?

No, that's Faughback. [C.McWilliam59]

That's your interpreter?

No, he was the paramedic.

OK. One of the ones that if I can talk to, that would be good.

Yeah, if you can talk to him, it would be good.

So after we got out, we toured Germany some more. Went to the Porsche museum, since I've been a Porsche nut since I was a little kid. I came back out of this one and was sick. But I was only back for two weeks, and by that time, they finally negotiated in Geneva *how* we were going to get the rest of the equipment out. So we went back in again, and that's *this* trip. We went back into Germany and Moscow, and then from Moscow to Kazakhstan, and finished loading out the equipment on the trains. This is November by now, so you can see [C.McWilliam60] there's already snow on the ground and it's getting cold and everybody's bundled up. And these are our two KGB escorts that time. So this guy's the driller [C.Mcwilliam61], this guy's the mechanic.

We're looking at picture sixty-one.

So he *drove* the drill rig and he kept the drill rig going. Now, this is a million-dollar piece of equipment, which is nowadays probably five million dollars, and so the Soviets were *real* concerned that they didn't damage this equipment. So we were loading up all that *other* drill equipment. I'm looking at the equipment we're loading on the train, and here's equipment *taller* than the drill rig and there's equipment *wider* than the drill rig.

So I turned to our escort, General Safanov, and I said, `Well, why can't we put the drill rig on the train, since this equipment's bigger and wider and everything else than the rig?`

So they got their Secretary of Transportation there helping us figure out how to transport this stuff. We had the highest of anybody in their government doing this stuff. And they'd go back and they'd go through a discussion and come back and say, `No.`

[And we'd ask] `Why?`

[And they'd say] `Can't do it.`

And it was just they wouldn't want to take the risk of something happening to it. So we flew out, flew back in, loaded—or drove, actually drove the drill rig from Kazakhstan, from the test site, into the main town to load it on an AN-124.

Is that one of their planes?

That's one of theirs, like, C-5s, bigger than a C-5. Cargo plane. We were the first Americans to be in an AN-124. No American had ever been inside of one. So by now it's late at night, snow falling, icy everywhere, and we're trying to load it on the AN-124. And they wanted us to back it in and we're telling them, `No, no, no, let's drive it in forward.` Well, we tried to back it in and we punched a hole in their plane with the stanchions, the jacks that would push down and hold the rig steady when it's drilling. So [they said] `Ahhh, OK, drive it in forward.` So we turned it around and drove it in. I tell people we put a red star on the door of the drill rig after punching a hole in their airplane.

They're just not used to thinking in terms of problem-solving, or even thinking of people questioning why they do things the way they do, did they?

No.

That was a new concept. That's a very American thing, isn't it?

Yes. All over the world, it is.

`Is there a better way to do things?`

That's one of the things that makes America great, if we keep the lawyers out of it.

So we got the drill rig finally loaded on. It was after midnight. Then their pilot comes and says, `We can't take off, with the storm. It's too cold. We can't get out. And it's too stormy. So we're going to have to postpone.`

So Safanov's with us, General Safanov, and he says, `OK, we'll go back to the site, get some sleep.`

Now, it's an hour-and-a-half trip back to the site. I'm going, Why don't we just stay at one of the hotels here, five minutes from the airport, in town?

And he says, Well, we can't do that.

I said, Why not?

[00:30:00] [And he said] Let me see.

So he goes back to make some phone calls. [And he comes back and he says] No, we can't. They won't let us.

"No" is just easier than "yes," isn't it?

Well, they have no way of thinking outside of the—I hate to use the—outside the box. They have no concept of making things happen. Because there was no reservations at the hotel, and the hotel's not a for-profit hotel, they don't want to jump through hoops and make a bed for some people coming in.

Customer service is a foreign idea.

No. I don't get anything for customer service, so why should I…? I'm just taking it back to the nth degree. The bottom line is, they're not happy because they don't get anything for their input, for what they put out, so why put out? I hate to use these guys, but I use this story anyway. On our way in, these two guys [showing a photograph] went off partying while we were in Moscow. Of course, they're drillers and mechanics, so they're used to it. They went into one of the—at *that* point, there were bars and restaurants that only foreigners could go into. So these are upscale compared to what the Soviets are used to. So some women come up to them and start talking and they're talking around and pretty soon they want to—they're hookers, so they want to charge them. Well, they go back to their homes, and it turns out they're really schoolteachers, and they do this on the side to make money. That was, I think, their first time. And the second time in, they did the same thing, these two, which they weren't supposed to be doing, but they'd

tell me after the fact. They went in and some *young* kids came in and picked them up, and take them back to Mom and Dad's house. Well, they're in there doing their thing and Mom comes in and says, `Keep the noise down. You're going to wake up your dad.` And they're telling me this and I'm going, `Boy, that's a sick society where Mom doesn't care that they're hooking on–`

Well, they're trying to get extra money.

Hard currency. Everybody wanted hard currency. They didn't want rubles.

It seems like maybe if they had been offered extra reimbursement at the hotel, maybe they would have understood something like that.

I think they would've been, but it had to be hard currency and they wouldn't take rubles. The general's got nothing but rubles to give them.

And he's probably in charge of paying for your *transport, and so you can't negotiate with American money.*

Our transport and housing. No. So that night, he *did* take us back and put us in the *best* housing they had on the site. He did the best he could with what he had. So we slept for three hours, and then got up the next morning and went back to the airport and got on the AN-124, and we took off and headed to Vladivostok.

He had to work within the socialist system, that the government owns everything.

Right. And so we're on this AN-124, and it's kind of like a C-5, where there's one part that's all cargo, and up above is seating area. And no restrooms. You have a tin can. That's what you get. And we're flying halfway across the country, so we're probably flying five hours. And it's freezing. They turn on the heat and now it's boiling. And we're sleeping because we haven't slept a decent night forever. And then we get into Vladivostok at night, we unload the drill rig, then we have to drive over to Nakhodka, which is an *open* city, because Vladivostok is military,

it's closed, nobody can *be* there. So here we are, the first Americans in Vladivostok in forever. So we're having to drive this drill rig over this mountain road that, before they would agree to do all this, this is why they dragged their feet for so long, they had to reimprove this road, and I could see where they've widened it here and they've cut the hill out here so we could get the drill rig over this hill over there. And so we're, in the middle of the night, doing that, and then we get into Nakhodka early the next morning, park the rig at one yard, and then get some sleep. And I think that day, we pretty much rested. But this is pictures of Nakhodka.[C.McWilliam62]

Sixty-two is Nakhodka, then. Not much to write home about, is it?

No. The first thing I asked our guides again, `Where's all the sailboats?` Because it's a *beautiful* harbor. It looks like San Francisco Bay. But not a single sailboat there. And his **[00:35:00]** comment was, `We don't have sailboats.` This is some of the area in Nakhodka [C.McWilliam63]. This is a sister city monument. This is one of our Soviet escorts. This is our interpreter that was worthless. This is all the loading docks. [C.McWilliam64] It's a *big* port. They're moving stuff in and out like crazy.

How long did it take you to do all this getting the equipment over there?

This part was like a two-week trip.

Because Shagan was about September 15.

Right. And we were there for about, I think it was, six weeks afterwards, so we're into the first of November. Came out for two weeks. Went *back* in.

You came to the States for two weeks?

Came back to the States, and finally—because negotiations weren't going anywhere to get it out, so I said, `Hey, this is nuts. Why stay here?` So we came home for two weeks, then, Oh, we have reached agreement. And I've got pneumonia. I'm the only one with a Soviet visa, so

there's nobody else that can lead the team, because it took *months* to get these visas out of the Soviet Union. So I go in, along with these other guys. And you can see, it's got colder than heck there. It snowed all over us. [C.McWilliam65]

Sure did, didn't it? Sixty-five, there. Nakhodka.

And here we are, crashed out in one of the rooms [C.McWilliam66].

Well, let me put a sixty-six on there.

And so finally what ends up happening is—

How did you stay sane?

We had a goal.

You knew it would get over with.

We were driving for that goal.

Because you probably felt isolated, too, then, didn't you?

Yeah, it's depressing. But this trip was so fast, and we weren't sleeping on any schedule or anything because you didn't have time to figure out when you were sleeping or not. It's kind of like settling down out in the ocean. You sleep when you can.

So finally, we had to go in and meet with the port captain. And we had a ship coming in to meet us here to on load the stuff, and he wasn't going to give us a berth. There had been a Polish ship in the harbor that had run out of diesel fuel waiting for a dock to open up so they could unload their stuff. The Soviets had to sell them diesel fuel so they could heat the ship, because everybody was freezing to death. And so we're concerned that *our* ship's going to get here and end up with the same thing. Our escort must've been pretty high up because he basically pounded on the table and said, Gorbachev and– I forget what their congress was

called at the time—passed this law. Here's the law. You *will* support this. So all of a sudden, a berth opened up and our ship had a place to come in.

The Duma*? Is that what that was called then?*

It may have been. I don't remember.

So after the snow, we had to *move* the drill rig. This is going down the road [C.McWilliam67]. We had to move it to—

This is a drill rig moving down the road.

—this is the drill rig, and this is it there [pointing on photograph] —to the other spot where it was going to come in. Well, we're coming down the hill and it's all icy, and we almost lost it over the side of the cliff.

And you took pictures of this story.

Yeah, I'm riding in the van behind it, and so I took pictures of it. We *almost* lost it over the edge.

You said it was so slippery.

So we just stopped. We just stopped there and told the Soviets, You clear the road, we'll go.

And they didn't clear the road, it just—

Just melted. I don't think I have—this was another interesting story. Because after we're doing all this, the port captain took us around and showed us the town. And I don't know if I have pictures of the mountains. There were two of these cones like this [C.McWilliam69] and Brezhnev—

That was picture sixty-nine.

They were supposed to take these mountains down and use the gravel for building roads and railroads and stuff. Well, all the paperwork going back under Brezhnev said, Yep, mountains are gone. And the port captain said, See? They're still there.

So it was just paperwork and they didn't have to finish the job.

Just on paper that they had removed a whole mountain.

And they had not actually finished the job.

And they hadn't done it. Nope.

It makes you wonder how many other paperwork things was different from the actual work.

I'm sure there was a lot of that.

[C.McWilliam70] And here's the drill rig just parked, waiting, in town. That's the KGB interpreter guy [pointing on photograph] that I gave the history book to.

[00:40:00] *Number seventy.*

They were so impressed with our drill rig. To us, it was just a drill rig. These are just more pictures of Nakhodka, the town. Finally, they started loosening up and they took us around town and [we] started getting pictures.

Was that a lighthouse tower there? [C.McWilliam71]

No. This is a barge, and they're picking up the drill rig with this *huge* crane. That was another negotiating thing.

So this is where you're getting it onto the ship. OK.

Onto the ship. And part of the negotiations involved, we had made up the spreader bar and all the cabling to lift it. Well, the Soviet guy running the—the operator of the crane said, `No, no, I want to use mine.` And so we went back and forth and back and forth, and finally I said, `OK. You use yours and if that drill rig falls, then you just bought a drill rig.` So he steps back a little bit, goes back, and comes back [and says] `OK.`

But it was amazing. I mean, you can see them lifting this drill rig, and this barge is floating, this crane is floating in the water, and he lifts that drill rig up—[C.McWilliam72]

Let's do a seventy-two on that.

And you can see how small it looks there, compared to what it looked like when you were up against it. It was a big vehicle. And they laid it down on our ship, right in the middle between all these other things. The guy did an amazing job.

I'm surprised, with all the tension that was going on, that you had the presence of mind to take pictures.

We had intelligence briefings going in and out, and the basic one, going in, `Take any picture you can get and bring them out.` Well, while we're in this shipyard, I'm taking pictures, and let's see if I have one in there. I don't think so.

As long as you can do it in an official capacity, then?

Well, and this is a commercial port, so I'm taking pictures of everything. And you can see a submarine sitting in here, in a commercial port. [C.McWilliam73]

Seventy-three.

I don't know if we want to put that in or anything. And out of nowhere, and I'm with our escorts and everything, a soldier walks up with an AK-47 and says, `No more pictures.`

And that was it.

That was it. So I quit taking pictures. *This* one, [C.McWilliam74] back there, I took when we were on board the ship, so I'm on a U.S. ship. He can't tell me what to do on board. So by then, when I'm on a U.S. territory, I went ahead and took some more, and that's where I got that.

So did you turn these pictures over?

These all got turned in, and I've got blow-ups of all these because I turned them in and they blew them up.

And you got to keep some for yourself.

Yes. And on board the ship, I finally got some penicillin to treat my pneumonia because the doctor on board there gave it to me.

Yes. Let me go ahead and put a seventy-four on that, because you just kind of—this is on board ship, was seventy-four.

Right. So then once we got everything loaded up, we also met the doctors in Nakhodka because I had gone to the hospital *there*. Went to the doctor that headed up the hotel [hospital]. Took us to where she lived. Now, this is the doctor that heads the hospital. She lived in one of those communal hotel type looking buildings. There was no heat in the hallway, no *floors* in the hallway except for dirt. The power had been out of the building and they had temporarily run a power line through the access door, over the access door and along the hallway, into the building power panel, and it was temporary but it looked like it had been that way for ten years. They had no restrooms in their individual rooms; they used a galvanized bucket, and down the hall were the restrooms and—

Really Third World.

Oh, I haven't seen anything that bad in the Third World, but I haven't been in any of the high rises yet down there. But yes. And she heads up a hospital. I said, `The doctors here need to take notice of what could happen to them.` Just amazing.

So, that trip, we ended up having dinner in Nakhodka, leaving on a bus like at nine o'clock at night, traveled all night to the airport in Vladivostok, got on an airplane in Vladivostok, flew the rest of the night, eleven hours, to Moscow, toured Moscow for a couple of **[00:45:00]** hours waiting for the flight to leave to, I think we went into Copenhagen that time. So we basically traveled, to get to Copenhagen, twenty-four hours? And that was Thanksgiving Day, so it was Thanksgiving. We had what we called chainsaw chicken. It's actually pretty good,

but the Russians take chicken and they fry it up in butter, and when they cut their chicken, it's just sawed, so you have pieces of bone.

So you have to really watch the chicken bones.

You have to watch what you eat, yes. They don't give you a breast. It's a breast that's been chopped up.

[C.Mcwilliam75] The guy that coordinated getting our ship in was actually a Greek that lived in Indonesia.

I've got number seventy-five.

And he lived with us. So when we were coming out through Moscow, we took him to some of the sites, like the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Lenin's tomb. Our drillers. St. Basil's in the day. Typical market. You can see, here's the store with nobody at it.[C.McWilliam76] Here's a truck backed up where people are selling stuff.

Black market?

Black market. And you can see everybody lined up.

Everybody wants the black market. That's a good story. That's a good picture right there. It really tells a lot about the contrasting conditions.

Yes. This is the trees around Moscow, the birch trees. [C.McWilliam77] So yeah, we did see a lot of those.

Seventy-seven. Well, we've got you past time. It's almost a quarter after. So I know she's [Katie McWilliam] going to be waiting for you down there.

[End of interview]