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#4 Mr. Thomas A. Campbell 1-18-57 "Continued recognition of this principle has been given by the Supreme Court of the United States. Von Hoffman ve. City of ftulncy, 4 Wall 535> 18 I*. Ed. 403; Murray v. flrmrleaton. 96 U.SV 432i 24 L. Ed. 76Oj Loumand v. New Orleans, 16% W.**S. 203, 26 L. Ed. 132. Revenue bonds (i.e., bonds payable from income of revenue producing facilities) are of comparatively recent origin and considerably fewer cases are to be found passing upon the rights of holders of revenue bonds than of general obligation bonds. However, the same principles against im­pairment of contracts will be applied to revenue bonds as are applied to general obligation bonds, as shown by the decision of tha Florida court in Duval County v. Jennings, 164 So. 358 (Florida, 1935). In that case bonds hacl been issued to con­struct a toll bridge. The statute at that time provided that all bridge tolls were to be expended, first, for the mainten­ance and operation of the bridge and, second, for payment of principal and interest upon the bonds. After the issuance of the bonds, the Legislature adopted a statute authorizing an election to be held to determine whether the bridge should be operated toll free. The court held this subsequent legisla­tion to be an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of contract with the bondholders. In that connection, the court stated (at p. 357)8 "Under the settled law of this state, all pro­visions of chapter 7462, supra [Sp. Acts 19173* relat­ing to the imposition and collection of tolls, became a part of the contract security given by that Act to all takers and holders of Duval county St. Johns River Bridge bonds. And such provisions cannot be subsequently changed or diminished by the Legislature to the prejudice or likely impairment of the obliga­tion of contract thus brought into existence when the bonds were sold pursuant to a statutory requirement for the imposition and collection of ‘reasonable 1 tolls as their security." The ease is also a square holding that where the bond statute provides for the fixing of tolls by one agency (the county circuit court), the Legislature cannot at a later date transfer the fixing of rates either to the Legislature or the voters. In this respect the court stated (164 So. at pp. 357