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* requires evidence to support it and findings of appropriate definiteness to express it. I!»The courts of this State have not been si­lent with respect to the necessity of specific^find­ings and determination of facts by administrative agencies. See' Pennsylvania' R.R. Co. v. N. J.^ State Aviation Comm., 2 N.J. 64,65A 2d 6l_(1949)j Gian- francisco v. 419, 11 N.J. Public*Service, etc., Transport, 165A Misc. 219'(Sup, Pennington Dairy Farms, Inc 746 (Sup.Cto 1937); way Dept. 129 N» J• ’). • j et. 1933); 118 N. J, and Hughes v. N'. J L. 273, 29A 2d 316 Rojeski v. L. 335, 192A State High- (Sup.Ct. 194* s” Clearly it is the function of the adminis­trative authority and not the courts to find the facts. Findings must be free from ambiguity which raises a doubt as to whether the administrative authority proceeded upon a correct legal theory. The most reasonable and practical standard is to re­quire that findings of fact be sufficiently specific under the circumstances of the particular case to enable a reviewing court to intelligently^review an administrative decision and ascertain if the facts upon which the order is b ased afford a reason­able basis'for such'order. This is a necessary rule where, as here; the findings of fact are con­clusive upon review, if supported by evidence. See 146 A.L.R. 209, et seq.’ N.1 J. Bell_Tel. Go; v. Communications Workers, etc., 5 N. J. 354, 3/5, 376, 75A 2d 721, 731 (1950).” The Railroad Company rate base fixed by the Commission did not include the right of way for pipe lines and power lines at its present cost. At page 16 of its opinion, the Commission said !’No consideration is given R/W because it is over the Com­pany’s land for the Company’s use”. This is clearly erroneous if it is intended to mean that the rights of way are for the exclusive use of the Railroad Company. These rights of way stand on the same footing as the water-bearing land and the water pro­duction facilities such as wells, reservoirs and pipe lines. -40-