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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 t use. Th® court suit', "In our judgment however, while i t may have 'been better le g isla tio n to have fixed and limited the p articu lar use fo r which the City/ of Brooklyn was authorized to ac­quire and hold the appellant’ s property, the m t is valid* Throughout i t declares the acquisition to he in the public interest and fo r the public use. The scheme suggests that the le g isla tu re deemed the matter of the water supply of too great public importance to he l e f t to private enter­p rise end i t should become a part o f the great municipal system. le g isla tu re must he presumed tc he the hast judge o f the necessity of public works and improvement®, o f how they sh all he instituted and o f how long they sh all he carried on, so as host to subserve public industry* Of the necessity fo r the exercise o f the right of eminent domain, the legislatu re is the Judge| hut whether the use fo r which the property is to be taken is a public use, which ju s t ifie s it s appropriation is a ju d ic ia l question upon which the courts ere free to decide* The opportunity fo r the presentation of that question and fo r obtaining a ju d ic ia l determination upon i t was d istin ctly provided fo r in the act. Shi act in the f i r s t section declares that ’ the public interest requires the acquisition by fee city of Brooklyn fo r the public use* of the properties o f the water company, and in the next section i t provided fo r the presentation o f a petition at & special term of the Supreme Court, which a fte r setting forth the description of the properties and franchisee and the names o f fee owners or o f the p arties having claims ©r interests therein, should pray ’ that said city may be authorized to take and hold said property and franchises forever fo r the public use, free of a l l lien s and encumbrances upon making a just compensation th erefor’ * * * * * the appellant*a other point as to anconst i tut tonality o f the act i s feat i t authorised condemnation of property which is already devoted to a public use without designating any d iffe ren t or large r public use to which i t 1® to be applied* He do not think that there i s force in th is objection** and then proceeds to make the statement cited in the Misqually case*- in Public Service Company vs City of Loveland, 245 la c . 493, the. supreme Court of the state of Colorado decided that the city was authorized to condemn the e le c tric distributin g cowpany of fee complainant under general statutes authorizing the city so to do. One paragraph o f said statute reads as follows? "Seventieth* Said c it ie s or towns art hereby authorized to condemn, and appropriate so much private property as sh all be necessary fo r the construction and operation o f said water, gas or e ls e t r ie s ! lig h t work® in such manner as may be prescribed by law* Said c ity or town sh all also have the right, to condemn end appropriate any water, gas, or e le c tric lig h t works not owned by such city or towh in such manner as is or may be prescribed by law fo r the condemnation of re a l estate * *